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NOTES
States as Litigants in Federal Court: Whether the
Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial Applies to
the States
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
tees civil litigants the right to jury trial in federal court: "In suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.... ." Although courts have
struggled to define the scope and meaning of this federal right over the
past two centuries,2 the Supreme Court has yet to determine whether the
seventh amendment right to jury trial extends to a state participating as a
litigant in an action brought in federal court.
The right to civil jury trial was established primarily to ensure im-
partial resolution of facts and to protect against arbitrary government
action.3 Jury trial was "intended to secure the individual from the arbi-
trary exercise of the powers of government... .-4 Given these underly-
ing purposes, the propriety of extending the seventh amendment right to
state litigants appears to depend upon whether the "individual" that the
jury trial was established to protect includes the state government. If the
seventh amendment protects against the arbitrary exercise of power by
state as well as federal governments, then granting a state government
the right to demand a jury trial would allow a state to exercise a right
established as a protection against itself. Such a result seems inconsistent
with the purpose of the seventh amendment. Yet, because trial by jury
occupies such a firm place in our history and jurisprudence, "every en-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment applies to civil actions in federal
court regardless of the basis of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, because federal subject mat-
ter jurisdiction is predicated on the existence of a federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), or
diversity of citizenship, id. § 1332, the seventh amendment applies to cases adjudicating federal
or state law. Federal law, however, governs the determination of jury trial rights in federal
court. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (per curiam).
Most states have constitutional jury trial provisions similar to the seventh amendment.
See Kane, Civil Jury Triak The Case for a Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 n.8
(1976); Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv.
639, 640 n.2 (1973). This Note does not discuss a state's right to civil jury trial in state court.
2. See Kane, supra note 1, at 1-2; Wolfram, supra note 1, at 639.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 157-67.
4. Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819).
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croachment upon it has been watched with great jealousy."5
Only the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have confronted the issue of
whether the seventh amendment right to jury trial extends to state liti-
gants in federal court, 6 each concluding that the state does have such a
right.7 Both courts purported to apply the traditional method used to
define the scope of the seventh amendment,8 the historic issue test, which
provides for a right to jury trial for issues that are legal in nature and of
the sort that would have been tried by a jury in 1791, the year the sev-
enth amendment was adopted.9
In Standard Oil Co. v. Arizona,10 the Ninth Circuit purported to
apply the historic issue test, but took an unprecedented leap by analyzing
whether the parties historically had a right to jury trial rather than
whether the issues historically were tried by juries. I This novel exten-
sion of the traditional test was legally unsupported, and the historical
findings upon which the court relied were inaccurate. Because of these
deficiencies, another court easily could apply the Ninth Circuit's reason-
ing to reach the contrary conclusion that the seventh amendment guar-
antee does not extend to states.
The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, did apply the traditional for-
mulation of the historic issue test in United States v. New Mexico. 12 In
holding that the scope of the seventh amendment extended to the
states,' 3 however, the court's conclusion rested solely on its determina-
tion that the issue involved was legal. The court failed to consider the
significance of the fact that a state was demanding a jury trial,' 4 and
whether that fact should have any effect on the application of the historic
issue test. Because the New Mexico decision failed to address the specific
question of whether a state litigant has a jury trial right under the
seventh amendment, it cannot be considered dispositive of that issue.
5. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (Story, J.); see Dimick v. Schiedt,
293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
6. The United States Supreme Court has not addressed this issue.
7. Standard Oil Co. v. Arizona, 738 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
815 (1985); United States v. New Mexico, 642 F.2d 397 (10th Cir. 1981).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 39-44.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 39-44.
10. 738 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 815 (1985).
11. See infra notes 24-30, 58-65 & accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit also concluded
that the federal antitrust laws did not provide the right to jury trial. Standard Oil, 738 F.2d at
1025 (citing In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1076-77 (3d Cir.
1980)). When a federal statute is silent on the jury trial issue, the Supreme Court usually
assesses the right to jury trial under the seventh amendment. Jorde, The Seventh Amendment
Right to Jury Trial of Antitrust Issues, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 18 (1981); see infra notes 51-52 &
accompanying text.
12. 642 F.2d 397 (10th Cir. 1981).
13. Id. at 400-02; see infra text accompanying notes 111-22.
14. New Mexico, 642 F.2d at 400-02.
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Therefore, like Standard Oil, the Tenth Circuit's opinion provides little
guidance to courts faced with this issue.
Another conceivable method for determining a state's seventh
amendment rights is to apply the approach taken in cases assessing the
constitutionality of the nonjury trial provision of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act ("FSIA"). 15 These cases' 6 utilize a broad application of
the historic issue test, focusing on whether the action embodying the
legal issues would have been tried by English juries in 1791.17 Because
England did not have "states" similar to the United States, this broad
application of the test would seem to deny any litigant the right to jury
trial in cases in which the state is also a litigant. This result is illogical
and contrary to the established principles of the seventh amendment.
Consequently, the broad test of the FSIA cases cannot serve as an appro-
priate standard for determining the extent of the states' rights under the
seventh amendment.
In light of the fact that the present lack of a sound basis for exten-
sion of the seventh amendment protection to states leaves open the possi-
bility of inconsistent determinations regarding that issue, this Note fully
examines this issue and develops a sound basis for extension of the sev-
enth amendment protection to states. The Note first discusses the tradi-
tional historic issue test. It then demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit's
application of the historic issue test in Standard Oil provides weak prece-
dent for extension of the seventh amendment right to the states. Next,
the Note demonstrates that the traditional historic issue test as currently
formulated and applied by the Tenth Circuit in New Mexico is inade-
quate to determine whether a state should be able to invoke the protec-
tions of the seventh amendment. The Note then applies the FSIA cases'
broad interpretation of the historic issue test to the issue of a state's sev-
enth amendment rights and concludes that the result is illogical and con-
trary to established law.
Finally, because application of the historic issue test fails to provide
adequate precedent for resolution of the issue, the Note argues that pol-
icy considerations underlying the seventh amendment should serve as
guidelines for determining a state's jury trial rights. The Note concludes
that extending the seventh amendment guarantee to the state is consis-
tent with these policy considerations, whether the federal court action is
based upon state or federal law. These guidelines should supplement the
historic issue test, which should be retained to determine the threshold
question of whether the underlying issue carries a right of jury trial. De-
termination of a state's seventh amendment jury trial right based upon
these policy considerations provides a sound basis upon which future
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1982).
16. See infra note 128.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 129-38.
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courts may rest their conclusion that the seventh amendment guarantee
extends to the states.
Traditional Historic Issue Test
The seventh amendment "preserves" the right to jury trial in "suits
at common law."' 8 The amendment, however, does not specify when
and why a litigant has a right to demand a jury trial. Over the past two
centuries, the courts have struggled to delineate the scope of the seventh
amendment guarantee.
The Historical Approach
Because the seventh amendment merely "preserves" the right to
jury trial, the Supreme Court has consistently held that, to define the
scope of the right, courts must refer to the common law of England 19 as
it existed in 1791,20 the year the seventh amendment was adopted. Ini-
tially, the Supreme Court determined whether a litigant had a right to
jury trial in federal court by using the "historical approach."'2' Under
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
19. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 379-80 (1913); United States v.
Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750). In Wonson, Justice Story
stated:
Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to [in the seventh amendment] is
not the common law of any individual state, (for it probably differs in all), but it is
the common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence. It cannot
be necessary for me to expound the grounds of this opinion, because they must be
obvious to every person acquainted with the history of the law.
Id. at 750.
While Justice Story might have thought that reference to English practice was "obvious,"
Professor Wolfram notes that "[n]o federal case decided after Wonson seems to have chal-
lenged this sweeping proclamation; perhaps later judges have hesitated to appear to be the kind
of intractable person that would require Mr. Justice Story to elaborate on the obvious." Wolf-
ram, supra note 1, at 641.
Reference to the common law of England in 1791 appears to be a compromise because the
individual jury practices of all the different colonies were so diverse. Id. at 654. See generally
Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966).
20. Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) ("The right of trial
by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the English common law when the
Amendment was adopted."); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935) ("In order to ascer-
tain the scope and meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the appropriate
rules of the common law established at the time of the adoption of that constitutional provision
in 1791.").
Under present English law, civil jury trial is available as a matter of right only in cases of
fraud, defamation, malicious prosecution, or false imprisonment. 16 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND 618 (Lord Hailsham 4th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as HALSBURY]; see also 37
HALSBURY, supra, 474.
21. See, e.g., Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935); United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 749-50 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
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this approach, a court determined whether the case in question would
have been tried at law or in equity in England in 1791.22 The right to
jury trial was decided on a "whole case" basis: if an action was predomi-
nately equitable in nature, the parties had no right to a jury trial; if the
action was generally cognizable at common law, and thus legal in nature,
jury trial was permitted.23
When analyzing statutory causes of action created since 1791, the
Supreme Court has reasoned by analogy to the common law of Eng-
land.24 "[T]he right of action should be analogized to its historical coun-
terpart, at law or in equity, for the purpose of determining whether there
is a right of jury trial," unless Congress has expressly prescribed the
mode of trial.25 If the issues in the new statutory cause of action are
analogous to issues that would have been tried by English juries in 1791,
the seventh amendment applies to the modem action.26 Thus, there is no
constitutional right to jury trial of issues that did not exist in England in
1791 or that have no close historical analogues.
Courts have determined what constitutes a "historical analogue" on
a case by case basis. Rather than articulating standards, courts have
made rough judgments concerning the similarity of historical statutes or
causes of action to their purported counterparts in modem litigation.27
Courts have focused on the issue in the modem action, not on the action
as a whole or the nature of the parties, and determined whether it is
analogous to a "legal issue" tried by juries in eighteenth-century Eng-
land.28 For example, the Supreme Court found in Pernell v. Southall
22. Kane, supra note 1, at 2.
23. Jorde, supra note 11, at 12.
24. For example, a right to jury trial was found in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978)
(suit for lost wages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1982)); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974) (summary action for repossession of
real property); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (action for damages and injunctive relief
for violation of fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612
(1982)); Fleitmann v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916) (private antitrust actions).
25. Note, Ross v. Bernhard: The Uncertain Future of the Seventh Amendment, 81 YALE
L.J. 112, 113 (1971) (citations omitted).
26. See supra text accompanying note 25; see also Jorde, supra note 11, at 11; Kane, supra
note 1, at 11-15.
27. See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 195 n.10 (1974); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830); see also Jorde,
supra note 11, at 11 n.40, 54.
28. According to the court in Martin v. Detroit Marine Terminals, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 579
(E.D. Mich. 1960), "the test is not whether such action is more or less broadly analogous to an
established common-law action, but rather whether such issue must, by analogy or because of
historical considerations, be characterized as a 'legal' issue." Id. at 582 (emphasis in original);
accord Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914, 918 (S.D. Tex. 1972); see also supra text
accompanying note 25.
Professor Jorde has suggested that it might be more logical to search for issue analogues
by first locating those English statutes and common-law causes of action existing in 1791 that
share an identity of purpose, parties, procedures, and relief with the modem litigation in ques-
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Realty 29 that the closest historical analogue to the statutory cause of ac-
tion for recovery of real property was an ejectment action. Because eject-
ment actions were tried before English juries in 1791, the Court held that
the right to jury trial existed in the modem action.30
The Historic Issue Test
In Ross v. Bernhard,31 the Supreme Court considerably refined the
historical approach. The Court held that "[t]he Seventh Amendment
question depends upon the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the
character of the overall action."' 32 The issue in Ross was whether there
was a seventh amendment right to jury trial in a shareholders' derivative
action in federal court. A shareholders' derivative action usually in-
volves both legal and equitable issues: the shareholders' standing to sue
on behalf of the corporation involves an equitable issue, while the under-
lying corporate claim often involves a legal issue.33 Traditionally, both
issues had been tried to the chancery court.34 The Supreme Court fo-
cused separately on each issue to determine whether a jury trial right
existed. The Court held that the shareholders' right to sue, an equitable
issue, must be tried to the judge as finder of fact, and the corporate claim
for damages, a legal issue, may be tried to a jury. 35
In a footnote, the Ross Court expressed the following approach for
the determination of whether an issue is legal:
As our cases indicate, the "legal" nature of an issue is determined
by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such
questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities
and limitations of juries. Of these factors, the first, requiring extensive
and possibly abstruse historical inquiry, is obviously the most difficult
to apply. 36
tion. "If such statutes or causes of action exist, then litigation involving them should next be
scrutinized to determine whether each of the issues present in the modem litigation has an
analogue, and if so, whether the analogue was tried to a judge or a jury." Jorde, supra note 11,
at 54.
29. 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
30. Id. at 375-76.
31. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
32. Id. at 538.
33. Id. at 534-35; see Kane, supra note 1, at 10.
34. Ross, 396 U.S. at 534; see Kane, supra note 1, at 10.
35. Ross, 396 U.S. at 539. The Court stated that since the merger of law and equity,
"there is no longer any procedural obstacle to the assertion of legal rights before juries, how-
ever the party may have acquired standing to assert those rights." Id. at 542.
36. Id. at 538 n.10. England in 1791 maintained separate court systems for suits in eq-
uity and actions at law. I W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 446 (6th ed.
1938). With the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
(1982)), Congress created a single federal judicial system in which the trial courts maintained
separate equity and law dockets. See 5 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 38.08[5-1] (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as J. MOORE]. All issues in equity were
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Because the seventh amendment mentions only that history should be
considered in the sense of "preserving" the use of the jury in 1791,37 the
Court's reference to the "practical abilities and limitations of juries" indi-
cates an injection of policy considerations into the determination of the
scope of the seventh amendment. 38
The Ross Court's refinement of the historical approach therefore
involves a two-stage, historic issue test.39 The first stage of the historical
analysis is to determine whether an issue is legal or equitable in nature.40
The three-step method set forth in the Ross footnote41 provides guidance
for this initial determination. New statutory causes of action are deemed
legal or equitable in nature depending upon whether an analogous issue
would have been tried by a jury or a judge in England in 1791.42 If the
issue is deemed equitable in nature, there is no right to jury trial. If the
issue is legal in nature, the second stage of the historical analysis is in-
voked to determine if the issue is of the sort that would have been tried to
a jury in England in 1791. 43 Courts have not answered this second in-
quiry by searching for an analogous issue that would have been tried to
an eighteenth-century jury. If the legal issue was tried before English
tried to a judge; once the court had jurisdiction in equity, it could invoke the doctrine of
"equitable clean-up" to decide the entire case, including legal issues which would have been
entitled to a jury trial if raised in a separate suit at common law. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509-10 (1959).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, enacted in 1938, abolished the distinction between
actions at law and suits in equity, see FED. R. Civ. P. 2, thus enabling parties to combine legal
and equitable claims. Id. Rule 18. These rules left open the question of which issues would be
tried to a jury or, if an action involved both issues triable by a jury and triable by a judge,
which issues would be tried first.
The Supreme Court sought to clarify this confusion in the following cases: Ross v. Bern-
hard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970) (jury trial questions depend upon the nature of the issue to be
tried rather than the character of the overall action); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,
472-73 (1962) (parties did not lose their seventh amendment rights when legal and equitable
issues were mixed); and Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508-11 (1959) (legal
and equitable issues in an action involved common factual question; these questions were to be
tried first to a jury).
The third factor enunciated in footnote 10 of Ross, 396 U.S. at 539 n.10, practical abilities
and limitations of juries, has led to some confusion because there is no precedent for employing
such a variable in seventh amendment analysis. See Jorde, supra note 11, at 27. Generally,
however, the lower courts have ignored the Ross footnote. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 614 (4th ed. 1983).
37. See supra notes 19-20 & accompanying text.
38. See Kane, supra note 1, at 11; Note, supra note 25, at 129-30.
39. Jorde, supra note 11, at 6-17. See generally 5 J. MOORE, supra note 36, 1 38.05[5];
Wolfram, supra note 1, at 640.
40. See Jorde, supra note 11, at 8-9.
41. Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10; see supra text accompanying note 36.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 24-30.
43. See Jorde, supra note 11, at 9-17. Not every issue in a common-law action was tried
by a jury. Certain issues were decided by common-law judges without the aid of a jury. See 5
J. MOORE, supra note 36, t 38.08[5-6]; Wolfram, supra note 1, at 640.
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juries in 1791, then there is a right to jury trial; if not, then there is no
such right.44
Ninth Circuit's Application of the Historic Issue Test
In Standard Oil Co. v. Arizona 4 5 the states of Arizona, California,
Florida, Oregon, and Washington brought separate actions charging ma-
jor oil companies with conspiracy to fix prices of refined petroleum prod-
ucts. The states brought suit in their proprietary capacities, as class
representatives, and as parens patriae.46 After these actions were trans-
44. Jorde, supra note 11, at 9-17. Professor Kane has suggested that although seventh
amendment decisions appear to expand the constitutional right to jury trial whenever the issue
is legal, these rulings should not be read too broadly. Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A
Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385, 423-24 n. 197 (1982). Professor Kane states that,
in these cases, the Court did not rule on actions that could not be brought in the common-law
courts regardless of the procedures available; the Court only considered whether, in view of
moderu procedural devices, a historically equitable action, such as a derivative suit, could be
tried to a jury when the action presented issues of a legal nature. Id. (citing Ross, 396 U.S.
531; Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 396 U.S. 469 (1962); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 359
U.S. 500 (1959)).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also envision that courts will decide the scope of the
seventh amendment right to jury trial on an issue by issue basis. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b)
("[A]ny party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury .... " (empha-
sis added)).
45. 738 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 815 (1985).
46. Id. at 1022. The Ninth Circuit also relied upon the fact that the state was suing as
parens patriae to strengthen its conclusion, based on its application of the historic issue test,
that the state may invoke the protections of the seventh amendment. The court stated that,
because the states were suing as representatives of their citizens, it would be anomalous to deny
the states the right to jury trial when citizens would have the right to jury trial if suing individ-
ually. Standard Oil, 738 F.2d at 1030-31.
The parens patriae doctrine developed in England for the protection of the rights of three
groups: children, mental incompetents, and charities. The Crown as parens patriae would
bring suit on their behalves. "American case law has developed another aspect of the parens
patriae power, the state's actions as 'quasi-sovereign.' This theory permits that state to bring
suit as a guardian of the well-being of its general populace .. " Curtis, The Checkered Career
of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 895, 895-98 (1976).
In addition to representing its citizens' interests, the state must exhibit a "quasi-sover-
eign" interest separate and apart from the interests of the particular private parties. 15 U.S.C.
§ 15(c) (1982). Quasi-sovereign interests have been defined as a set of interests that the state
has in the well-being of its populace, sufficiently concrete to create an actual controversy be-
tween the state and the defendant. Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 602
(1982). Because a state acting as parens patriae must allege an interest separate and apart from
the citizen's interests, the parens patriae concept should not be heavily relied upon to justify a
state's right to jury trial.
The court also relied on EEOC v. Corry Jamestown Corp., 719 F.2d 1219 (3d Cir. 1983),
for the proposition that the right to jury trial should not be affected by the fact that suit is
brought by someone in representative capacity. Corry Jamestown is not strong precedent for
this proposition because the EEOC's right to jury trial was based on statutory grounds. The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982), specifically
provided that a "person," one who is entitled to sue and to a jury trial under the ADEA,
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37
ferred to the United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia for coordinated pretrial proceedings, the states demanded a jury
trial of the legal issues in their antitrust actions.47 The oil companies
moved to strike the jury demand, arguing that the seventh amendment
guarantee does not extend to states as litigants.48 The district court held
that states have a right to jury trial of legal issues under the seventh
amendment,49 and the oil companies appealed to the Ninth Circuit.50
Consistent with the maxim that, when possible, courts must resolve
cases on statutory grounds before reaching constitutional questions,51 the
Ninth Circuit first addressed the question of whether the federal antitrust
statutes52 provided for a right to jury trial. The court found that neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court had ever faced this issue.53 Based on its
review of legislative history and Supreme Court precedent, the court con-
cluded that "no right to jury trial flows directly from the antitrust
laws." 5
4
Unable to determine a state's jury trial rights in antitrust actions on
statutory grounds, the court analyzed the issue under the seventh amend-
ment. In accordance with the traditional formulation of the historic is-
sue test, the Ninth Circuit stated that that test involved two inquiries:
whether the issues are legal and, if so, whether they are of the sort that
would have been tried by English juries in 1791.55 The court, construing
this test, then stated that it must first decide "whether the issues involved
are legal in nature and second, if actions brought by government entities
were tried to juries in 1791."56 As to the first inquiry, the court held that
antitrust suits involve legal issues. 57
The court explained that the second inquiry was necessary because
even issues "legal" in nature were sometimes tried to a judge, not by a
jury, in England in 1791.58 The court stated that the right to jury trial in
eighteenth-century England could turn on "matters such as sovereign
includes those acting as a "legal representative." Id. § 630(a). The Third Circuit reasoned
that the EEOC was suing as a "legal representative" and, therefore, was entitled to a jury trial.
Corry Jamestown, 719 F.2d at 1223-24.




51. See Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam); Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978).
52. Federal antitrust statutes include the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982), and the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982).
53. Standard Oil, 738 F.2d at 1023-25.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1027.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1026.
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immunity which are extraneous to the legal-equitable distinction." 59
Thus, in order to answer the second inquiry-a determination of
whether legal actions brought by state governments were tried to juries in
eighteenth-century England-the Ninth Circuit reasoned by analogy be-
cause there were no states in eighteenth-century England.60 The court
found that the state is analogous to the Crown because both entities are
in similar legal positions in their respective systems of government and
both are sovereign entities that cannot be sued without consent. 6 1 The
court then stated that the Crown was entitled to a jury trial on demand
in England in 1791.62 Supporting this conclusion, the court cited four
English cases63 and quoted a passage from a Third Circuit case, EEOC v.
Corry Jamestown Corp.64 The Ninth Circuit then concluded that, under
the historic issue test, the state could invoke the seventh amendment
guarantee. 6
5
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning is flawed in several respects: first, the
court departed from precedent in its application of the historic issue test,
in particular by employing historical party analogues in the second-stage
historical analysis; second, the court incorrectly analogized the state to
the Crown; and third, the court failed to support adequately its conclu-
sion that the Crown had a right to jury trial in England in 1791.
First, while the Ninth Circuit stated the historic issue test correctly
in the abstract, it incorrectly applied that test. Expounding the historic
issue test in the abstract, the court properly stated that the two inquiries
required by that test were whether the issues involved were legal and, if
so, whether these legal issues would have been tried to a jury in eight-
eenth-century England.66 In the paragraph immediately following that
statement, however, the court, paraphrasing the test in the context of the
issue before it, framed the second inquiry as a determination of whether
"actions brought by government entities were tried to juries in 1791.1' 67
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1027.
61. Id. at 1026.
62. Id. at 1027-28.
63. Id. at 1028 (citing Rex v. Peto, 148 Eng. Rep. 577 (Exch. 1826); The King v.
Humphrey, 148 Eng. Rep. 371 (Exch. 1825); The King v. Marsh, 145 Eng. Rep. 824 (Exch.
1793); The King v. Cotton, 145 Eng. Rep. 729 (Exch. 1751)).
64. 719 F.2d 1219 (3d Cir. 1983). "At common law, the jury was developed not merely
as a protection of the individual, but also by the monarchs for their use. Indeed, after the
Norman Conquest juries were 'the prerogative rights of Frankish kings.' " Id. at 1224 (quot-
ing 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 140 (2d ed. 1898 &
photo. reprint 1952)). The Third Circuit held in this case that the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission ("EEOC") is entitled to a jury trial when it brings suit on behalf of an
individual employee for violations under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). Corry
Jamestown, 719 F.2d at 1224-25.
65. Standard Oil, 738 F.2d at 1028.
66. Id. at 1027.
67. Id.
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The first indication of a flaw in the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, this state-
ment contravenes precedent by focusing on the action rather than the
issue, echoing the historical approach rejected by the Court in Ross.68
Furthermore, as a result of framing the second inquiry as it did, the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning took two further unprecedented turns: first,
injection of the identity of the demanding litigant into the historic issue
test; and second, reasoning by historical party analogies rather than rea-
soning by historical issue analogies.6 9 Research does not reveal a single
case in which a court has searched for historical party analogues, in
either the first or second stage of the historic issue test. In addition,
courts have searched only for historical issue analogues and have only
done so in the first-stage historical inquiry, which is the determination of
whether the issue is legal in nature.70 Thus, while precedent exists for
basing the right to jury trial on whether an analogous issue carried such a
right in England in 1791, precedent does not exist for basing a jury trial
right on whether an analogous party had such a right in England in 1791.
One justification for this unprecedented reasoning could be that only by
such broadening of the focus of the historic issue test could the court
squarely address the issue of whether a state has a seventh amendment
right to jury trial.71 If the Ninth Circuit properly had formulated the
second inquiry as applied to this case, the inquiry would have been
whether antitrust issues, deemed legal in nature as a result of the first
inquiry, would have been tried to a jury in eighteenth-century England.
Second, while unprecedented reasoning may not be inherently im-
proper, the Ninth Circuit analogized incorrectly. The court found that
the state was analogous to the Crown because both entities are in similar
legal positions in their respective systems of government and because
both are sovereign entities. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's conclusion,
however, a state as a litigant is not analogous to the Crown as a litigant.
While the state and the Crown are in the same legal position in their
respective systems of government to the extent that both are governmen-
tal entities and both enjoy some measure of sovereign immunity, the state
and the Crown are different types of governmental entities and enjoy dif-
ferent kinds of sovereignty. The Crown is a national sovereign, while the
state operates in a system of dual sovereignty and is sovereign only
68. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970); supra text accompanying notes 31-
38.
69. See supra notes 24-30 & accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 24-30 & accompanying text.
71. In United States v. New Mexico, 642 F.2d 397 (10th Cir. 1981), the Tenth Circuit
applied the historic issue test as traditionally formulated to determine whether a state has a
seventh amendment right to jury trial. Because the traditional historic issue test focuses only
on the issues involved, the court was unable to squarely address the issue of a state's seventh
amendment rights, although it purported to do so. See infra text accompanying notes 111-24.
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within its jurisdiction.72 As a result, the state is unable to exert the same
degree of control and influence over the federal court system that the
English sovereign exerted over the English courts.73 In particular, the
Crown and the state differ with respect to their ability to influence laws
adjudicated in the national courts and the judges sitting therein. 74
The Crown influenced the formulation of all laws that were adjudi-
cated in the English courts;75 states, on the other hand, may influence the
law adjudicated in the federal courts to a more limited extent. Because
federal subject matter jurisdiction can be predicated on both diversity76
and federal question jurisdiction,77 both state and federal law are adjudi-
cated in the federal courts.78 While states control the formulation of state
laws, they cannot directly influence the formulation of federal laws.
In addition, the English sovereign was capable of exerting substan-
tial influence over the judges in its courts. The judges of the king's courts
72. The state operates in a system of dual sovereignty because the government of the
United States is a federal system. B. BLANK, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 59-60
(1973); S. DAVIS, THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE 121-22 (1978); W. MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES 433-34 (3d ed. 1927). In other words, power is divided between two
popularly elected governments, a natural government that is sovereign within the whole terri-
tory of the nation and a state government that is sovereign only within the territory of the
state. W. BENNETT, AMERICAN THEORIES OF FEDERALISM 122-27 (1964); B. BLANK, supra,
at 59-60; S. DAVIS, supra, at 121-22; W. MUNRO, supra, at 433-46.
Although the principle of national supremacy will prevail when a state and national ac-
tions are in conflict, S. DAVIS, supra, at 122; W. MUNRO, supra, at 433-35, each state is sover-
eign because it has the original and complete authority over things within its jurisdiction. Id.
at 435. As Chief Justice Marshall aptly explained: "'In America,' .... 'the powers of sover-
eignty are divided between the government of the Union and those of the states. They are each
sovereign with respect to the rights committed to it, and neither is sovereign with respect to the
rights committed to the other.'" Id. at 435 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,
410 (1819)).
73. See infra notes 75-81 & accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 75-81 & accompanying text.
75. See J. EHRLICH, EHRLICH'S BLACKSTONE 66-68 (1959); 1 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 140.
76. Diversity jurisdiction is found when the controversy is between citizens of different
states or between a citizen of a state and an alien, 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3601 (1984), and the amount in controversy exceeds
$10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982).
77. The Constitution provides that federal courts may be given jurisdiction over "all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.
1. Cases that fall under this heading of jurisdiction are usually spoken of as involving a "fed-
eral question." Original jurisdiction is conferred upon the federal courts over cases involving
questions of federal law. 28 U.S.C § 1331 (1982). For a more complete discussion of federal
question jurisdiction, see C. WRIGHT, supra note 36, at 90-126.
78. As a result of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts in diversity
cases apply state substantive law through federal procedure. The Supreme Court consistently
has held that the right to jury trial is determined by reference to federal law. E.g., Simler v.
Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (When the seventh amendment requires, but state law de-
nies, a jury trial, the federal court must allow the jury trial.).
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were the king's servants; he appointed and could dismiss them at a mo-
ment's notice. 79 In contrast, the state governments have no power either
to appoint or to dismiss federal judges.80
The differences in the governmental nature of the Crown and state
and their influence over their national court systems undercuts the anal-
ogy between the two entities. These differences also indicate that the
protection afforded by jury trial against undue governmental influence
over the national court system is more applicable to the Crown than to
the state.81
The sovereign immunity granted to the states by the eleventh
amendment to the United States Constitution82 also differs significantly
from that enjoyed by the English sovereign. The English sovereign en-
joys absolute sovereign immunity; it can never be sued without its con-
sent.83 The immunity granted by the eleventh amendment to the states,84
however, is limited: a state may be sued in federal court without its con-
sent in at least four situations.85
79. J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 143-46 (2d ed. 1979).
80. U.S. CONT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The President shall appoint federal judges.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 157-85.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
83. At common law, the Crown could not be sued eo nomine without his consent. 11
HALSBURY, supra note 20, % 1401; Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HARV. L. Rv. 1, 1, 3, 5-6 (1963). Before passage of the Crown Proceedings
Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, ch. 44, §§ 1, 42, the only methods of redress against the Crown
were by way of a petition of right requiring the Crown's consent, 11 HALSBURY, supra note 20,
1 1401; Jaffe, supra, at 1, 3, by suits against the Attorney General for a declaration, or by
actions as ministers and government departments that had been incorporated or declared liable
to suit by statute. 11 HALSBURY, supra note 20, 111401. See generally id. 1 969. The Crown
Proceedings Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, ch.44, §§ 1, 42, enables civil proceedings to be taken
against the Crown in the same circumstances as against a subject with certain exceptions. 11
HALSBURY, supra note 20, 1402; see also C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 7 (1972); Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U.
COLO. L. REv. 139, 153 n.69, 154 n.70 (1977).
84. The eleventh amendment was ratified in response to the unpopular decision of
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419 (1793). In that case, the Supreme Court held that
the Constitution permitted a citizen of one state to sue another state in federal court even
though the state had not consented to such suit. The eleventh amendment has been inter-
preted to prohibit in federal court suits against a state by a citizen of another state, a citizen of
the state itself, or an alien, except when the state has consented to suit. C. WRIGHT, supra note
36, at 767-68; see Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 487-92 (1887).
85. First, implied consent has been found when a state has acted under federal law. E.g.,
Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186-87 (1964) (state commenced operation of a railroad
after the enactment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982)); Petty
v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm., 359 U.S. 275, 276-78 (1959) (state acted under an inter-
state compact that had been approved by Congress). Second, Congress can remove a state's
eleventh amendment immunity by legislation. E.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451-56
(1976). Third, the state's consent is not required in suits by one state against another. E.g.,
South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 315 (1904) (The state is deemed to have con-
sented by accepting the Constitution, which grants federal jurisdiction over "controversies be-
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Thus, the relationship between the Crown and its national courts in
1791 was significantly different from the relationship between the state
and the federal courts in the United States today. The Crown was capa-
ble of exerting substantial influence over its national courts, while the
state is relatively powerless to influence directly the federal court system.
It follows then that the purposes underlying the establishment of trial by
jury-protection against arbitrary government action influencing the
judges of the national courts and the laws adjudicated therein as well as
assurance of an impartial resolution of the facts 86-are more applicable
to the Crown rather than to the state.87 These significant differences be-
tween the Crown and state as litigants indicate that the Crown is not the
proper analogue to the state.88
Finally, even if the analogy to the Crown were proper, it is not clear
that the Crown actually had a right to demand a jury trial in 1791. Re-
search has not revealed one English case adjudicated around 1791 that
shows that the Crown demanded, or even had the right to demand, a jury
trial. While the Ninth Circuit cited four English cases to support its
conclusion, 9 these cases neither confronted the issue of whether the
Crown had the right to demand a jury trial nor mentioned which party
demanded a jury trial.90 In addition, a thorough reading of leading
tween two or more states." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.). Fourth, consent is not necessary in
actions by the United States against a state. E.g., United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699
(1950); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 641-46 (1892); C. WRIGHT, supra note 36, at 274,
766-68.
86. See infra notes 157-67 & accompanying text.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 161-85.
88. "We must be careful not to attach too much importance to seeming analogies, or
mistake partial resemblances for complete identity." W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY
JURY 6 (2d ed. 1971).
89. See supra note 63 & accompanying text.
90. The facts of each case also fail to provide any support for the Ninth Circuit's conlu-
sion that the Crown had the right to demand a jury trial in England in 1791. The case of Rex
v. Peto, 148 Eng. Rep. 577 (Exch. 1826), involved an action for breach of contract for failure
to perform in accordance with the specifications in the contract. The defendant claimed that
he did not breach the contract because the surveyor directed him to vary from the original plan
in the contract. The court ruled in favor of the Crown because the surveyor was not author-
ized to direct the defendant to deviate from the contract. Id. at 583-84.
The issue before the court in The King v. Humphrey, 148 Eng. Rep. 371 (Exch. 1825),
was whether a wharfinger's general lien upon the goods of his customer in his possession for
his balance shall prevail against an immediate extent issued against that customer being the
king's debtor. Id. at 373. The court held that the Crown was bound by the custom of trade
establishing that lien and, therefore, the Crown had the right to seize those goods only upon
payment of the amount owed to the wharfinger by the customer. Id. at 380.
In The King v. Cotton, 145 Eng. Rep. 729 (Exch. 1793), the issue was whether goods
taken in distress, but not yet sold, by a landlord for payment of rent past due can be seized on
an extent for the King's own debt. Because goods distrained are in the custody of the law, id.
at 732, and because of the general rule of preference to the King's debts, id. at 733, the court
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English 91 and American 92 commentaries does not indicate whether the
Crown had the right to demand a jury trial in eighteenth-century
England.
The passage from the decision in EEOC v. Corry Jamestown Corp. 93
also fails to support the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the Crown had a
right to demand a jury trial. The passage from the Corry Jamestown
decision describes twelfth-century inquisition practices rather than eight-
eenth-century trial by jury. While monarchs initially developed jury trial
solely for their own use,94 by the eighteenth century jury trial was a right
afforded the individual against abuses by the Crown.95 The jury's role in
the twelfth century was that of an administrative fact finder for the
Crown, closer to that of a witness than a jury in today's federal system.96
The principle underlying jury trial was to get information useful to the
Crown from those people most likely to have it.97 Jurors came from the
county where the crime or event occurred98 and testified as to their
held that the King's extent, issued after the distress but before sale, shall prevail against the
distress. IM. at 738.
The issue in The King v. Marsh, 145 Eng. Rep. 842 (Exch. 1793), was whether, in an
action for breach of an indenture in discharge of recognizance, a defendant who pleads per-
formance of the conditions contained therein is bound to produce the indenture itself. The
court held that the defendant was required to produce the document unless he showed that it
was destroyed or not in his possession. Id. at 843. Thus, because the defendant did not show
any of these reasons for failure to produce the document, his plea was faulty. Id. While three
of the four cases mention the word "jury," none of the cases specify who demanded the jury
trial or the issue of the right to demand a jury trial. In addition, two of the cases, Rex v. Peto
and The King v. Humphrey, were decided in the nineteenth century, a number of years after
1791.
91. The following English sources do not express or imply whether the Crown had the
right to demand a jury trial in England in 1791: J. BAKER, supra note 79; W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES (G. Tucher 2d ed. 1969); E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
(1809); W. FORSYTH, supra note 88; M. HALE, PREROGATIVES OF THE KING (1976); M.
HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (C. Runnington 6th ed. 1820); 8,
11, 16, 36 & 37 HALSBURY, supra note 20; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 36; C. LOVELL,
ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY (1962); T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HIS-
TORY OF THE COMMON LAW (5th ed. 1956); H. STEPHENS, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND (1845); C. VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY (1746).
92. The following American commentaries do not specify whether the Crown had the
right to demand a jury trial in eighteenth-century England: J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL
(1949); C. JACOBS, supra note 83; J. MOORE, supra note 36; L. MOORE, THE JURY (1973); 1 B.
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1971); 19 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1985); Jaffe, supra note 83; Jorde, supra note
11; Kane, supra note 1.
93. 719 F.2d 1219, 1224 (3d Cir. 1983); see supra text accompanying note 64.
94. T. PLUCKNETI, supra note 91, at 110.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 101-10.
96. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 138-40.
97. T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 91, at 109-11.
98. W. FORSYTH, supra note 88, at 102; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 91, at 109-11, 127.
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knowledge of the event.99 Thus, trial by jury actually had no place in the
ordinary procedure of England's old courts. °°
Furthermore, contrary to the suggestion of the Corry Jamestown
passage, while jury trial was the prerogative right of the monarchs of the
twelfth century, it was not the prerogative right of kings in eighteenth-
century England. Trial by jury was referred to as a "royal prerogative"
in twelfth-century criminal cases because the defendant was not entitled
to jury trial as a matter of right. 0 1 By the end of the seventeenth century,
the right to jury trial was no longer a "royal prerogative."' 10 2
The process by which the "modem" jury evolved, in which jurors
ceased to be witnesses and became judges of fact, did not begin until the
Magna Carta in 1215103 and was largely completed by the end of the
fourteenth or fifteenth century.'°4 The process of change indicates that
trial by jury was not a right that would have been afforded the Crown.
Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta, for example, declares, "no free man
shall be captured or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in
any way destroyed ... except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by
the law of the land."' 1 5 This statement, as well as other language in the
Magna Carta, indicates that the right to jury trial belonged to the indi-
vidual. 10 6 By 1468, according to Sir John Fortescue's description, jury
trial closely resembled jury trial in modem form: the jury was a body of
impartial men; evidence was presented by parties and counsel in open
99. W. FORSYTH, supra note 88, at 102; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 91, at 127-29.
100. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 140.
101. W. FORSYTH, supra note 88, at 362-63; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 91, at 127-29.
The defendant was entitled to jury trial by the king's grace and favor, which was obtained
through the payment of money or chattels. It is also interesting to note that until 1772, a
defendant in a criminal case could not waive jury trial. Without a jury trial, the defendant
could not be acquitted or convicted; if never convicted, the defendant's goods and chattels
could not be forfeited to the Crown. Id. at 125-26.
102. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 92, at 41-46.
103. C. LOVELL, supra note 91, at 115-16; L. MOORE, supra note 92, at 49-51; 1 B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 92, at 5-7. Professor Schwartz points out that whether the framers of
the Magna Carta intended Chapter 39, declaring the right to jury trial, to be read as a guaran-
tee of trial by jury to all men, the Magna Carta has ultimately had that effect. Id. Espousing a
somewhat opposite view, Professor Wolfram argues that historians no longer "accept the
Magna Carta pedigree for jury trial." Wolfram, supra note 1, at 653 n.44.
104. See J. BAKER, supra note 79, at 65; C. LOVELL, supra note 91, at 110; L. MOORE,
supra note 92, at 59-60; T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 91, at 129-30.
105. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 92, at 5-7.
[The] Magna Carta is primarily a feudal document directed against specific feudal
abuses committed by the King against his tenants-in-chief. The wrongs done to the
barons may have been the direct cause of the Magna Carta, but the language used
was broad enough to protect the entire nation against government oppression.
Id.
106. See Wooster v. Plymouth, 62 N.H. 193, 196 (1882) ("By the express terms of the
great charter, the right of trial by peers was not a security of the government, but a liberty
granted by the sovereign to his free subjects.").
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court; and witnesses were examined upon oath. 0 7 The English Bill of
Rights of 1689108 further secured jury trial as it is known today. Declar-
ing the rights and liberties of the English citizens, it, among other things,
ended the struggle against the existence of jury trial only through royal
prerogative.10 9 Additionally, English commentators also have concluded
that trial by jury was a security afforded the individual against abuses by
the Crown. 0
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's conclusion, English history indi-
cates that trial by jury in 1791 was a protection afforded the individual
against arbitrary abuses by the Crown. It was not an instrument for use
by the Crown or a protection afforded the Crown against itself. Further-
more, English case law does not support the proposition that the Crown
had a right to demand a jury trial in 1791.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit's approach is inadequate because the
court, in an abrupt and unexplained departure from precedent, searched
for historical analogues to the parties rather than to the issues involved.
Moreover, the court incorrectly analogized the state to the Crown, ignor-
ing the fundamental differences in the two types of sovereigns. Finally,
even if the analogy were proper, the court's assertion that the Crown had
the right to demand a jury trial in England in 1791 is historically inaccu-
rate. Another court faced with the same issue would find little guidance
in the reasoning in Standard Oil and easily could reach the opposite con-
clusion. Even if another court agreed with the injection of party ana-
logues into the second stage of the historic issue test and also agreed with
107. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 91, at 129-30. In contrast to Sir John Fortescue,
Plucknett believed that trial by jury assumed its modem form by the seventeenth century. Id.
at 129-30. He noted that, while Fortescue's picture of jury trial was "becoming the practice"
in the fifteenth century, "relics" of the older form of jury trial survived occasionally. Id.
108. 2 W. & M., ch. 2; see 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 92, at 40-43.
109. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 92, at 41-46; see also J. EHRLICH, supra note 75, at 45-
48, 52-53.
110. Forsyth stated that the jury was a bulwark against arbitrary action on the part of the
Crown. W. FORSYTH, supra note 88, at 426. "The trial by jury is that point of their liberty to
which the people of England are most thoroughly and universally wedded." Wooster v. Plym-
outh, 62 N.H. 193, 195 (1882) (citing DE LAUDIBUS CONST., ch. 13, para. 136)).
The framers of the United States Constitution also regarded the jury trial as a right of the
citizens and not of the federal government. Hamilton wrote:
"A declaration of rights," says Hamilton, "under our constitution must be in-
tended to limit the power of the government itself. It has been several times truly
remarked that bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their
subjects, abridgments of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not
surrendered to the prince. Such was the Magna Charta, obtained by the barons,
sword in hand, from King John . . . . Such, also, was the declaration of right
presented by the lords and commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688, and afterwards
thrown into the form of an act of parliament called the bill of rights."
Wooster, 62 N.H. at 199-200 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 558 (A. Hamilton) (R.
Luce ed. 1976)).
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the analogy between the state and the Crown, there is no sound historical
basis for finding that the Crown had a right to demand a jury trial in
England in 1791. The lack of sufficient evidence showing that the Crown
actually had a right to jury trial might persuade a court to conclude that
the state, as a party analogous to the Crown, would not have the right to
demand a jury trial. In addition, the Ninth Circuit's analysis provides no
guidance to a court that might reject the analogy between the state and
the Crown.
If another court were to reject the use of party analogues, the court
would apply the traditional formulation of the historic issue test. The
next section analyzes the effectiveness of the traditional historic issue test
as a method to resolve the issue of a state's right to jury trial under the
seventh amendment.
Traditional Application of the Historic Issue Test
The inadequacy of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the historic
issue test to provide solid precedent for the determination of a state's
seventh amendment rights begs the question of whether the traditional
interpretation of that test would provide a more sound basis for resolu-
tion of that issue. In United States v. New Mexico, I I the Tenth Circuit
applied the traditional historic issue test in a federal tax suit against New
Mexico and concluded that the states had a seventh amendment right to
demand a jury trial.'1 2 Using New Mexico as an example, this section
analyzes whether that test is an effective method to determine a state's
jury trial rights.
In New Mexico, the United States sued the State of New Mexico for
assessing and collecting an allegedly unauthorized tax against a private
contractor employed by the federal government. The federal district
court denied New Mexico's jury trial request. 1 3 On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit applied the traditional historic issue test to determine whether
the state had a seventh amendment right to jury trial." 14
The Tenth Circuit first analyzed whether the tax refund suit was
legal or equitable in nature." 5 In accordance with the first stage of the
traditional historic issue test, the court applied the three-part test set out
in the Ross footnote" 6 and concluded that the issue presented was legal
111. 642 F.2d 397 (10th Cir. 1981).
112. Id. at 400-02.
113. Id. at 398.
114. Id. at 399.
115. Although state law was in dispute, the court properly referred to federal law to deter-
mine whether there was a seventh amendment right for this issue. Id. (citing Simler v. Conner,
372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963)).
116. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970): see supra text accompanying note
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in nature.' 1 7 Answering the second inquiry of the traditional historic
issue test, the Court then, examining English and American precedent,
determined that tax refund suits instituted by individual taxpayers are
the sort of actions that would have been tried to English juries in 1791.118
To reaffirm this common-law recognition of a right to jury trial, the
Tenth Circuit noted that a federal statute 19 provided for a right to jury
trial on demand by either party in suits against the United States for the
recovery of taxes wrongfully collected. 120 The court reasoned that it
would be anomalous for the federal government to recognize the right of
jury trial in tax refund cases in which the United States is a defendant,
but not in cases in which it is a plaintiff.' 2 ' Thus, the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that, as the defendant in the action, the state should have the right
to demand a jury trial. 122
Although the Tenth Circuit examined the different nature of the
jury trial rights of the United States and of individuals, the court failed to
discuss the significance of the fact that a state government made the jury
trial demand. The Tenth Circuit did not enunciate its reasoning or pro-
vide support for its assertion that the seventh amendment guarantee ex-
tended to states; rather, it determined only that the issue involved was
triable to a jury under the historic issue test.
Because the court routinely applied the traditional interpretation of
the historic issue test, the issue of a state's jury trial rights was not a
factor in the decision. As currently formulated, that test only focuses on
the issues underlying the action. 123 It does not provide a framework or
methodology for deciding whether, if the issue satisfies both stages of the
traditional historic issue test, the state litigant may demand a jury trial
for that issue.
The New Mexico decision, which completely fails to address
whether the seventh amendment guarantee extends to states, cannot be
dispositive of that issue. The New Mexico decision demonstrates that the
historic issue test is an inadequate method of determining a state's sev-
enth amendment rights. The nature of the state as the demanding liti-
gant must be examined to ensure consonance with the purposes of the
seventh amendment: fair and impartial resolution of factual issues and
117. New Mexico, 642 F.2d at 399-401.
118. Id. at 400-01.
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982) provides that "[a]ny action against the United States under
section 1346(a)(1) shall, at the request of either party to such action, be tried by the court with
a jury." Id. Section 1346(a)(1) provides that federal courts have jurisdiction over court claims
against the United States for the recovery of taxes wrongfully collected. Id. § 1346(a)(1).
120. New Mexico, 642 F.2d at 401.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 402.
123. See supra notes 39-44 & accompanying text.
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protection against governmental abuses. 124
Interpretation of the Historic Issue Test in Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act Cases
As an alternative to the traditional formulation 125 and the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation 126 of the historic issue test, another possible ap-
proach to determining a state litigant's seventh amendment rights is to
apply the broad interpretation of the historic issue test as formulated in
cases challenging the constitutionality of the nonjury trial provision of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 127 In those cases, 128 several cir-
cuit courts have recognized the need to consider the governmental nature
of a foreign sovereign in determining a litigant's jury trial rights in a suit
against a foreign sovereign. Upholding the constitutionality of the
nonjury trial provision of the FSIA, these courts deviated from the tradi-
tional historic issue test by focusing on the action as a whole rather than
on the specific issues. 129 In other words, these courts determined
whether the action was a suit at common law in England in 1791, not
whether the legal issue was tried to an eighteenth-century English
jury. 130 This broad interpretation of the second stage of the historic issue
test differs from the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of that test because the
approach in the FSIA cases does not involve a search for party ana-
logues. 13 1 Rather, the FSIA analysis looks at all components of the exis-
tent action, including the nature of the parties and relief sought.' 32
By applying a broad interpretation of the second stage of the historic
issue test in the FSIA cases, the Second, 133 Third, 134 and Fourth 135 Cir-
124. See infra text accompanying notes 157-67.
125. See supra notes 111-22 & accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 51-65 & accompanying text.
127. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2), (4), 1391
(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982). Section 1330 precludes jury trials in suits against foreign sover-
eigns. Id. § 1330.
128. Rex v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 67-69 (3d Cir. 1981); Wil-
liams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 881-83 (4th Cir. 1981); Ruggiero v. Compania
Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872, 878-81 (2d Cir. 1981).
129. See supra notes 39-44 & accompanying text.
130. Rex v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 67-69 (3d Cir. 1981); Wil-
liams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 881-83 (4th Cir. 1981); Ruggiero v. Compania
Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872, 878-81 (2d Cir. 1981).
131. See supra notes 58-65 & accompanying text.
132. Rex v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 63-67 (3d Cir. 1981); Wil-
liams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 881-83 (4th Cir. 1981); Ruggiero v. Compania
Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872, 879 (2d Cir. 1981).
133. Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872
(2d Cir. 1981).
134. Rex v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981).
135. Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981).
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cuits have reasoned that, because immunity precluded actions against
foreign sovereigns in eighteenth-century England, such actions did not
exist at common law in 1791.136 Consequently, there could have been no
right to jury trial in such actions. Thus, these circuits have held that,
because a suit against a foreign sovereign was not a suit at common law,
the nonjury trial provision of the FSIA is consistent with the seventh
amendment.137 As one commentator noted, "[O]ne cannot preserve what
never existed."1 38
When applied to the issue of whether a state litigant in federal court
has a right to jury trial, the formulation of the second stage of the his-
toric issue test in FSIA cases leads to the conclusion that the state does
not have such a right. Parallel to the reasoning of the FSIA cases, this
result follows because the American concept of state government did not
exist in England in 1791. Thus, regardless of the underlying cause of
action, a state could not demand a jury trial under this analysis.
The FSIA formulation, however, does not determine a state's jury
trial rights satisfactorily because it leads to an illogical result on the ques-
tion of whether private litigants have a jury trial right in actions to which
a state is also a party. Because the FSIA cases justify the constitutional-
ity of the FSIA's nonjury trial provision on the basis that there was no
cause of action against foreign sovereigns in eighteenth-century England,
the same reasoning would deny a jury trial right to a private litigant in an
action against a state on the grounds that no cause of action existed
against the state because the state did not exist in 1791. This result
would contravene the well-established jury trial right of private litigants
whenever the state is an opposing party. 139 Furthermore, the FSIA anal-
ysis as applied to this issue is unsatisfactory because it would resolve it
based upon the nonexistence of a particular litigant in eighteenth-century
England rather than upon the fact that the right to jury trial did not
exist. The broad application of the historic issue test in FSIA cases fails
to consider whether the demanding litigant would have had the right to
jury trial in 1791 based on the issues involved, had that litigant existed at
that time. Because the FSIA formulation of the historic issue test fails to
provide a sound basis for the determination of a state's jury trial rights, it
should not be relied upon for resolution of that issue.
136. Rex v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 660 F.2d 61, 67-68 (3d Cir. 1981); Williams v.
Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 881 (3d Cir. 1981); Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de
Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872, 879 (2d Cir. 1981).
137. Rex v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 660 F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1981); Williams v.
Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 883 (3d Cir. 1981); Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de
Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872, 879 (2d Cir. 1981).
138. Kane, supra note 44, at 423.
139. See supra notes 39-44 & accompanying text.
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Policy Considerations Underlying the Seventh Amendment
As shown above, reference to eighteenth-century England fails to
define a state's jury trial rights under the seventh amendment. The his-
toric issue test, as applied traditionally,1 40 or by the Ninth Circuit,141 or
in the FSIA cases, 142 fails to resolve adequately the issue of whether a
state government has a right to demand a jury trial under the seventh
amendment.
When reference to English history fails to resolve seventh amend-
ment jury trial questions, as demonstrated above, courts should resort to
policy considerations underlying the seventh amendment.143  The
Supreme Court on several occasions has decided jury trial issues by refer-
ring to policy underlying the seventh amendment when reference to Eng-
lish history failed to resolve the issue. In fact, several key developments
in the interpretation of the seventh amendment have sprung from the
impact of procedural reform on historical distinctions.
For example, in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover 144 the Supreme
Court established that historical rules should be applied in light of mod-
em procedure. 45 In that case, the Court tolled the death knell for the
equitable clean-up doctrine, which permitted ancient courts of equity to
retain jurisdiction over and dispose of equitable claims even though, in so
doing, legal issues also were decided. 146 The Beacon Theatres Court
reasoned that the justification for equity's deciding legal issues once it
obtains jurisdiction must be reevaluated in light of the expansion of ade-
quate legal remedies and the liberal joinder provisions provided by the
Declaratory Judgment Act 147 and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 48 Thus, the Court held that when legal and equitable claims are
joined in one action and share common issues, the legal claim should be
tried first in order to avoid depriving the party of a determination by jury
of the common issue.149 By rejecting the equitable clean-up doctrine, this
conclusion permits jury trial in cases that historically had been tried in
equity. The Beacon Theatres Court, therefore, considered changes in
modem procedure and the policy favoring jury trial, 50 rather than ex-
140. See supra notes 111-22 & accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 51-65 & accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 127-39 & accompanying text.
143. C. WRIGHT, supra note 36, at 612.
144. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
145. Id. at 507.
146. Id. at 509-10; see Kane, supra note 1, at 8.
147. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1982).
148. 359 U.S. at 510; see FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
149. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510.
150. Id. at 510 n. 18. Prior to Beacon Theatres, the Court analyzed policy considerations
in upholding the constitutionality of a six-person jury in criminal cases. Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1970).
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clusively relying on the common law of England in 1791.
The Court in Ross v. Bernhard15' deviated from history and prece-
dent by treating the derivative action as involving severable claims and
by injecting policy considerations in well-known footnote ten. 152 By in-
cluding "the practical abilities and limitations of juries" as a factor in
determining the "legal" nature of an issue, 153 the Ross Court injected
policy considerations in the resolution of seventh amendment ques-
tions. 154 It has been asserted that the extension of the jury trial right in
Ross was not dictated by the seventh amendment, but instead represented
a policy decision by the Court favoring jury trial in civil actions.' 55
Because reference to English history fails to resolve the issue of
whether a state has a seventh amendment right to jury trial, policy con-
siderations underlying the seventh amendment should form a basis for
determining that issue. Thus, a state should have the right to demand a
jury trial only if extension of the seventh amendment protection to states
is consistent with, and in furtherance of, the policies and purposes behind
trial by jury. This would ensure a result that is consistent with the pur-
poses of that amendment and would provide a sound precedential basis
for possible future adjudications of the issue. In contrast to any of the
interpretations of the historic issue test discussed above, an analysis
based on policy considerations allows a court to focus directly on
whether the seventh amendment guarantee extends to a state litigant.
Because the issue of a state litigant's jury trial right is not reached
unless the issues underlying the action are appropriate for a jury trial, the
threshold question nevertheless is whether the traditional historic issue
test provides for a seventh amendment right to jury trial of the issues
underlying the action.' 56 Only if the issue satisfies the historic issue test
is the question of a state's right to demand a jury trial of that issue
reached. The inquiry then must be whether granting the state the right
151. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). For a more thorough discussion of this case, see supra text
accompanying notes 31-37.
152. Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10; see supra text accompanying notes 36-37; see also Note,
Jury Trial in a Stockholders' Derivative Suit, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 697, 700 (1970); Note, supra
note 25, at 118 (citing The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 174-76 (1970)).
153. Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10.
154. See Kane, supra note 1, at 11; Wolfram, supra note 1, at 644.
155. Kane, supra note 1, at 11-12. Professor Wright asserts that the Ross Court's injec-
tion of policy considerations spurred the argument that juries should not be used in complex
cases of great duration. C. WRIGHT, supra note 36, at 614-15.
Other commentators have questioned whether examining the state of the law almost two
centuries ago can really aid the resolution of jury trial issues. See, e.g., Shapiro & Coquillette,
The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442
(1971). Professors Shapiro and Coquillette assert that since there were significant changes in
process in the relationship between law and equity in England in 1791, "[a]ny snapshot of the
English system as of 1791 is therefore likely to be misleading and, in any event, of little utility
in coping with present-day problems." Id. at 449.
156. See supra notes 39-44 & accompanying text.
March 1986]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
to demand a jury trial is consistent with, and in furtherance of, the pur-
poses of trial by jury. Thus, analysis of a state litigant's seventh amend-
ment rights is an issue separate and distinct from that of whether the
issues underlying the action carry a jury trial right.
Trial by jury was established in England and in the United States for
two main purposes. 157 The first purpose was to ensure a fair and impar-
tial resolution of factual questions.158 The jury, a group of twelve impar-
tial persons, protects against the possible biases of the judge. 159
Commentators have asserted that a judgment of twelve persons brings
about a more equitable resolution of factual issues than a judgment of
one person. 160
157. Judge Jerome Frank lists and then refutes the following eight purported purposes of
civil jury trial. The first purported purpose ofjury trial is that juries are better fact finders than
judges. Judge Frank argues that if this were so, then judge trials should not be permitted. J.
FRANK, supra note 92, at 126. Furthermore, he asserts that the practice of directed verdicts
recognizes that juries may return verdicts which no reasonable man would consider justified by
the evidence. Id. at 126-27. The second purpose is to have jurors serve as legislators and
nullify unjust rules. Id. at 127. Judge Frank contends that there is no basis in fact that jurors
are especially equipped to know the "social sense of what is right." Id. at 130. The third
purpose of jury trial is to protect against corrupt or incompetent trial judges. Id. at 135. Judge
Frank argues that resort to juries for this purpose is a "feeble device," because in many cases,
"the litigant cannot have a jury trial, [and] must try his case before a judge without a jury."
Id. The fourth purpose is to educate and create confidence in the government. Id. Judge
Frank argues that this purpose cannot actually be proved. Id. The fifth purpose is to satisfy
the citizens' demand for participation in government. Id. at 135-36. In response, Judge Frank
points to the large number of citizens who seek to be excused from jury service. Id. at 136.
Judge Frank argues that the sixth purpose, jury trial as popular entertainment, is antiquated.
Id. He summarily disagrees with the seventh purpose, that juries are a means of necessary
humane individualization. Id. Judge Frank labels the eighth purpose of jury trial to "provide
buffers to judges against popular indignation aroused by unpopular decision," and "ingenious
rationalization." Id. at 136-37. He points out that judges are obliged to accept public criti-
cism in the many cases in which there is no jury. Id. at 137.
158. For support for this purpose as a reason for the establishment of the seventh amend-
ment right to jury trial, see Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973). See also Gasoline
Prods. Co. v. Champlin Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931); EEOC v. Corry Jamestown Corp., 719
F.2d 1219, 1224 (3d Cir. 1983). It has been asserted that juries are better fact finders than
judges because jurors come from all classes of society, are randomly selected, and provide
twelve differing viewpoints. See J. FRANK, supra note 92, at 126. Indicating that this purpose
was a reason for the maintenance of jury trial in early England, see W. FORSYTH, supra note
88, at 355-58; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 91, at 129-30. See also 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 619; De Parcq, Thoughts on the Civil Jury, 3 TULSA L.J. 1, 6
(1966).
159. See De Parcq, supra note 158, at 6; Summers, Some Merits of Civil Jury Trials, 39
TUL. L. REV. 3, 6 (1964); Wolf, Trial by Jury: A SociologicalAnalysis, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 820;
cf. J. FRANK, supra note 92, at 126-37 (disputing proposition that jurors are better fact finders
than a trial judge).
160. De Parcq, supra note 158, at 5-9; Summers, supra note 159, at 6. A number of psy-
chological studies have shown that group decisions are fairer and more accurate in fact-finding
than decisions of an individual. De Parcq, supra note 158, at 5.
Based on the results from several studies, including The Jury Project of the University of
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A fair and impartial resolution of factual issues is important to all
litigants, whether private or governmental. 161 To the same extent as pri-
vate litigants, state litigants need the protection afforded by jury trial
against a federal judge's possible biases or prejudices. Hence, the first
purpose of the seventh amendment applies to state as well as private
litigants.
The second and foremost purpose of jury trial, as it developed in
England and the United States, was to protect the individual against ar-
bitrary actions on the part of the Crown1 62 or, in the United States, on
the part of the federal government. 163 Two specific protections are en-
compassed within this purpose: protection against arbitrary laws formu-
lated by the Crown' 64 or by the federal government, 165 and protection
against corruption of the judges by the Crown' 66 or by the federal
government.167
An analysis of this second purpose of jury trial in relation to a state's
seventh amendment rights must be separated according to the two types
of federal subject matter jurisdiction: federal question jurisdiction 68 and
diversity jurisdiction. 169 The fact that state as well as federal law is adju-
Chicago Law School, Professor Kalven concludes that judges and juries agree on the same
verdict in the majority of cases. Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055,
1064 (1964). Judge and jury agreed in 80% of the criminal cases. Id. In personal injury cases,
the judge and jury agreed in 79% of the cases. Id. at 1065. Professor Kalven also found that
the level of disagreement between judge and jury regarding liability or guilt remained the same
regardless of whether judges had classified the case as difficult or easy. Id. at 1066.
161. EEOC v. Corry Jamestown, 719 F.2d 1219, 1224 (3d Cir. 1983).
162. J. FRANK, supra note 92, at 109; H. STEPHENS, supra note 91, at 418-19; see Bank of
Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 241 (1819); Wooster v. Plymouth, 62 N.H. 193,
195 (1882); E. COKE, supra note at 91, at 41; L. MOORE, supra note 92, at 50; infra notes
174-75.
163. J. FRANK, supra note 92, at 109; Wolfram, supra note 1, at 705-08; see Bank of Co-
lumbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 241 (1819); infra notes 176-79 & accompanying text.
164. J. FRANK, supra note 92, at 128; see infra notes 174-75 & accompanying text.
165. J. FRANK, supra note 92, at 109, 127; Wolfram, supra note 1, at 644, 705-08. The
framers insisted upon the constitutional guarantee of civil jury trial to guard against unwanted
legislation passed by a misguided national legislature. Id.; see infra notes 176-79 & accompa-
nying text.
166. The judges of the king's courts were "very truly the king's servants .. " I F. POL-
LOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 204. He appointed and could dismiss them at a
moment's notice. Id. "In the seventeenth century contests with the Stuart kings, [the jury]
came to be highly regarded, popularly, as a check on royal judges doing the Crown's bidding."
J. FRANK, supra note 92, at 109.
167. J. FRANK, supra note 92, at 109; Wolfram, supra note 1, at 708-10. The framers
feared that a federal judge sitting without a jury would be likely "to protect the officers of
government against the weak and helpless citizens." Wolfram, supra note I, at 708 (citation
omitted). Thus, "juries in civil cases were intended to guard private litigants against the op-
pression of judges." Id. at 709; see THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 563-64 (A. Hamilton) (J.
Cooke ed. 1961).
168. See supra notes 1, 77.
169. See supra notes 1, 76.
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dicated in federal court affects the analysis of the policy considerations
underlying jury trial.
Federal Question Actions
The second purpose of jury trial is to protect against arbitrary fed-
eral legislation and undue influence over the federal judges. 170 In federal
question cases, federal judges adjudicate federal law. 17 1 The laws are en-
acted by Congress; the states have no direct control over their formula-
tion or enactment. Similarly, federal judges are appointed by the
executive branch of the federal government and Congress confirms such
appointments; 72 state governments do not participate in the appoint-
ment of federal judges. Consequently, in federal question actions in fed-
eral court, the state litigant is unlikely to exert influence, improper or
otherwise, over either the federal legislature or the federal judiciary.
Because the state is unlikely to exert improper influence over the
federal laws and judges, the state government does not pose the same
potential threat of abuse of the federal system as does the federal govern-
ment. Thus, in federal question actions, granting the state the right to
jury trial would be consistent with the purposes of trial by jury: the jury
would ensure a fair and impartial resolution of the facts and would re-
main a barrier against potential federal government abuses. Accord-
ingly, the seventh amendment guarantee should be extended to states in
actions in federal court based upon federal questions.
Diversity Actions
In actions in federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction, federal
judges adjudicate state law. 17 3 Although states are unable to exert influ-
ence over the appointment of federal judges, in diversity actions states
have the power to influence the law adjudicated. As a result, the argu-
ment could be made that granting the state the right to jury trial in diver-
sity actions is inconsistent with the second purpose of jury trial.
Yet, even in diversity actions the overall balance of policy considera-
tions underlying the seventh amendment weighs in favor of granting the
states a right to jury trial. The fact that state law, rather than federal
law, governs the dispute in diversity actions affects only part of one of the
two main purposes of jury trial. The interests in the impartial resolution
of the facts and in the protection against undue governmental influence
over federal judges are still served by granting state litigants a right to
jury trials in diversity actions. Indeed, the only policy consideration ar-
guably inconsistent with extending seventh amendment protection to
170. See supra notes 162-67 & accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 1, 77.
172. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
173. See supra notes 1, 76.
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states is the interest in protecting a litigant from arbitrary legislation.
The result could be that, in a diversity action adjudicating state law, the
state could exercise a right established as a protection against potential
abuses by its own governmental power. This concern that granting the
state a right established to protect against arbitrary legislation may be
inconsistent with the spirit of the seventh amendment, however, is less
compelling in light of the following facts.
First, in England and the United States, the jury trial was estab-
lished as a protection against abuses by a national governmental entity,
not by a regional governmental entity such as a state. Several English
commentators have stated that in England, jury trial is regarded as a
right of the English populace against arbitrary action by the Crown. 174
The Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights were grants of liberties
from the Crowns of England to their subjects. 175
In the United States, the framers of the Constitution preserved the
right to jury trial in order to protect against arbitrary action by the na-
tional legislature. 176 On several occasions, the Supreme Court also has
indicated that the seventh amendment right to civil jury trial is intended
to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the power of the
federal government. 177 Additionally, the district court in United States v.
Griffin,178 confronting the issue of whether the United States was entitled
to a jury trial in a federal condemnation suit, reasoned that "[t]he first
ten amendments were intended to protect the people from governmental
aggressions" and that it was "a mere perversion of the purpose and intent
of the Seventh Amendment to contend that it gives the [federal] govern-
ment a right to a jury trial in any case."' 179
Thus, American case law, as well as English and American com-
mentaries, suggests that jury trial is aimed at protecting the individual
against arbitrary action in federal court by the federal government, not
174. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 91, at 349-50; W. FORSYTH, supra note 88, at
426.
175. Wooster v. Plymouth, 62 N.H. 193, 195-200 (1882); 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 92,
at 4-8, 40-46.
176. J. FRANK, supra note 92, at 139; Wolfram, supra note 1, at 705-08; see supra note 110.
177. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830); Bank of Columbia v. Okely,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819).
178. 14 F.2d 326 (W.D. Va. 1926).
179. Id. at 326-27. The federal statute for condemnation proceedings provided that a fed-
eral court was to conform its procedure to that of the state in which the district court lies. Id.
at 326 (citing 25 Stat. 357 (1888) (repealed 1944)). The applicable state statute prohibited jury
trial and provided for the appointment of condemnation commissioners. Griffin, 14 F.2d at
326 (citing VA. CODE ch. 176 (1919) (repealed 1970)). The court, therefore, held that the
United States had waived its right to jury trial in federal condemnation suits. Griffin, 14 F.2d
at 327. The court's reference to the seventh amendment pertained only to the federal govern-
ment and is dicta. The holding in Griffin should be limited to its facts because it was decided
on statutory grounds.
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the state government. Thus, granting the state the right to a jury trial in
diversity cases would not contravene the stated purpose of jury trial to
protect against federal governmental abuse.
Second, the arguments for recognizing the state's right to jury trial
in diversity actions is strengthened by the fact that the outcome of any
suit by or against the state necessarily will affect the citizens of that state.
In particular, a state may bring a suit in its proprietary capacity, just as
an injured individual or corporation would,18 0 or as parens patriae. 181
The parens patriae doctrine permits the state to bring suit on behalf of all
its citizens, as a guardian of the well-being of its general populace. 182 In
analogous situations, the Supreme Court has held that the right to jury
trial on legal issues is unaffected by the fact that suit is brought by some-
one acting in a representative capacity. 183 Denying the state the right to
jury trial when citizens suing individually would have such a right is
anomalous. Furthermore, in certain cases, the claims asserted may not
be significant enough for individual litigants to bring suit, but may be
collectively important enough to the state from a public policy stand-
point to do so in a representative capacity. 184 Affording the state a jury
trial right recognizes the individual citizens' rights to a jury trial. 85
Summary
In sum, consideration of the policies underlying the seventh amend-
180. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 318-19 (1978) (foreign nation
held to be a "person" within the meaning of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982), and
thus entitled to sue under the federal antitrust statutes); Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162
(1942) (domestic state held to be a person within the meaning of the federal antitrust statutes
and thus entitled to bring suit pursuant to those statutes).
181. See supra note 46 & accompanying text.
182. See supra note 46 & accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1970) (A corporation's right to jury
trial in a shareholders' derivative action is not forfeited merely because its shareholders are
pressing the claim for the corporation.); EEOC v. Corry Jamestown Corp., 719 F.2d 1219,
1225 (3d Cir. 1983) (When the EEOC brings suit on behalf of a victim of age discrimination, it
is entitled to a jury trial.).
184. Nuisance, see, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), or anti-
trust claims, see, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), may not be signifi-
cant enough for individuals to bring suit, but may be collectively important enough for the
state to do so in a representative capacity.
185. Standard Oil v. Arizona, 738 F.2d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
815 (1985).
It could also be argued that extending the seventh amendment guarantee to states in
diversity actions would promote uniformity and the federal policy favoring jury trial. 9 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 92, § 2302; see Byrd v. Blue Ridge Coop., 356 U.S. 525,
538 (1958). The state would then have the right to demand a jury trial in all actions in federal
court regardless of the basis of subject matter jurisdiction. Uniformity would not compromise
the protections afforded by jury trial because even though state law may be in dispute, jury
trial would still be needed to ensure an impartial resolution of the factual issues and to protect
against undue influence by the federal government over federal judges.
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ment indicates that a state should have the right to demand a jury trial in
all actions in federal court, whether the action is based upon federal ques-
tion or diversity jurisdiction. The state as a litigant does not pose the
same threats of abuse of governmental power in federal court as does the
federal government. The state cannot directly influence federal judges or
federal law. While the state does influence the law adjudicated in diver-
sity actions, the policies favoring an impartial resolution of the facts and
protection against federal judges' biases make extending the seventh
amendment protection to states consistent with the purposes of that
amendment. Consequently, the "individual" that jury trial was intended
to secure "from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government" 186
should include the state government.
Conclusion
Reliance on English common law should not exceed its usefulness.
The historic issue test has proven to be inadequate for determining a
state's jury trial rights under the seventh amendment. The Ninth Cir-
cuit's application of the historic issue test in Standard Oil v. Arizona ' 87
relies upon an unprecedented use of party analogues and an incorrect
analogy between the Crown of England and state governments in the
United States to support its conclusion that the seventh amendment
guarantee extends to states. Consequently, the decision is unconvincing
and serves as weak precedent.
While the Ninth Circuit's application of the historic issue test inade-
quately resolves the issue of states' jury trial rights, the Tenth Circuit's
traditional application of that test in United States v. New Mexico 188 fails
to confront the issue. The Tenth Circuit failed to consider the signifi-
cance of the fact that a state government made the jury trial demand.
This omission is particularly anomalous in light of the fact that the Tenth
Circuit examined the nature of the federal government's jury trial rights.
Applying a broad interpretation of the second stage of the tradi-
tional historic issue test, as in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
cases, 189 to the issue of a state's jury trial rights would lead to a result
contrary to common sense and established law.
By considering the policies underlying the seventh amendment, the
issue of whether that amendment extends to states as litigants can be
squarely confronted and adequately resolved. As demonstrated above,
granting the state the right to jury trial in federal court, regardless of the
186. Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819).
187. 738 F.2d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 815 (1985); see supra
notes 55-65 & accompanying text.
188. 642 F.2d 397 (10th Cir. 1981); see supra notes 111-22 & accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 127-39 & accompanying text.
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basis for subject matter jurisdiction, is consistent with and furthers the
purposes of jury trial.
The right to jury trial symbolizes, among other things, notions of a
fair trial. States as litigants in federal court are entitled to a fair and
impartial resolution of the facts and to protection against potential arbi-
trary action by the federal government or federal judiciary. Basing a
state's seventh amendment right to demand a jury trial on the policies
underlying that amendment secures the state the right to jury trial and is
faithful to the spirit of the seventh amendment.
Julia A. Dahlberg*
* Member, Third Year Class.
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